U.S. Navy plans to base submarines in Australia as a strategic hedge against conflict with China

7 February 2026

Photographer: SOPA Images/LightRocket

In the shifting landscape of Indo-Pacific geopolitics, the U.S. Navy is quietly repositioning itself for a future in which great-power conflict with China, especially over Taiwan, is treated not as a distant risk but as a strategic priority requiring preparation now. Central to this recalibration is a plan to use HMAS Stirling, a naval base on Western Australia’s Indian Ocean coast, as a forward operating location for American nuclear-powered attack submarines and other naval assets, effectively turning a longtime Australian Defence Force facility into what some strategists now call an “insurance policy” for war with China. The base’s growing role reflects how the United States and its allies are deepening military integration, investing in shared infrastructure and seeking geographic advantages that could be decisive in any future clash with Beijing.

Stirling sits near the port of Fremantle, about an hour south of Perth, in a part of Australia long removed from the frontlines of Asia’s most contentious flashpoints. Yet its location is precisely what makes it valuable to Washington’s strategic calculus: far enough from China’s intermediate-range ballistic missiles to be relatively secure, yet close enough to the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait to support rapid deployment, repairs and resupply of submarines and other naval forces. While the United States already stations submarines at Guam and maintains significant naval infrastructure at Pearl Harbor and on the U.S. mainland, those facilities could be vulnerable in the event of hostilities. Guam, in particular, is within range of Chinese missile systems that could threaten military assets early in a conflict.

Under plans developed in concert with Australia and the United Kingdom through the AUKUS security partnership, the U.S. Navy anticipates maintaining up to four attack submarines at Stirling by the late 2020s, with the first scheduled to arrive around 2027. These will be rotational forces rather than permanently based boats, reflecting Australia’s longstanding policy against hosting foreign bases on its soil, even as the operational reality makes Stirling function effectively as one. Australia is investing billions of dollars to expand the base’s infrastructure, including upgrades to piers, housing, training grounds, energy systems and facilities to handle radioactive waste preparations designed to support sustained submarine operations and allied personnel.

For the United States, the value of a Western Australia facility goes beyond geography. It offers a complementary logistics hub for repairs and maintenance that currently occur at more distant locations. In wartime, the ability to fix damaged submarines and return them to combat swiftly could be decisive, and Stirling’s facilities combined with planned expansion at the nearby Henderson precinct, which includes dry-dock capabilities aim to fill gaps in the Pacific sustainment architecture. Rear Admiral Lincoln Reifsteck, who commands a U.S. submarine group, told visitors to the base that such a capability would enhance the Navy’s ability to recover from damage and reengage in operations quickly.

The Australian government has framed U.S. deployments as “rotational,” but analysts note that the scale of planning, the investment in local infrastructure and the expectation of thousands of allied personnel moving to the region suggest a sustained presence of American and allied forces. The AUKUS pact itself, established in 2021 to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, envisages deeper defence cooperation, including Australia acquiring its own fleet of nuclear-powered submarines in the coming decade and interoperability among partner forces. This broad strategic alignment signals a shift in regional security dynamics, with Canberra, London and Washington presenting a united deterrent posture against potential Chinese aggression.

The expansion of Stirling and the deepening military integration also highlight several challenges and debates. Building out major maintenance and shipyard facilities in Henderson requires not only construction but also a skilled workforce in a region where mining and other commercial industries compete for labor. Environmental concerns have been raised by locals, and some Australians worry that hosting a large contingent of U.S. submariners could make the country a more attractive target in a conflict. There is also political debate about national sovereignty whether Canada’s strategic interests align with allowing such expanded foreign military activity on its territory when the nation itself is not acquiring a nuclear submarine fleet. Critics argue that such arrangements could bind Australia too closely to U.S. strategic gambits, potentially drawing it into conflicts not of its own choosing.

Proponents of the plan counter these concerns by pointing to the strategic benefits. A stronger allied naval presence in the Indo-Pacific is seen as a deterrent that could convince Beijing that military action against Taiwan or other regional partners would come at too high a cost. Submarines, with their stealth and endurance, are central to this deterrence: they can operate covertly near contested waters, gather intelligence and, if necessary, apply pressure on sea lines of communication that are vital to China’s economy. Australia’s maritime trade heavily reliant on secure sea lanes stands to benefit from such collective security arrangements.

The choice of Stirling also reflects broader shifts in U.S. defence planning over the past decade, as Washington seeks to adapt to renewed great-power competition after years focused on counterinsurgency and Middle Eastern engagements. Building redundancy into basing options, diversifying geographic points of access and fostering interoperability with allies are all part of a recalibrated approach that treats China as the primary strategic competitor. The Indo-Pacific, housing more than half the world’s population and a significant share of global trade, has become the central theatre of this competition and bases like Stirling are tangible manifestations of that focus.

Whether these preparations will ultimately serve as effective deterrence or simply escalate tensions remains a subject of debate among policymakers and scholars. Some caution that expanding visible military capabilities may provoke countermeasures from Beijing or contribute to a security dilemma where each side’s attempts to enhance defence are interpreted as offensive postures by the other. Yet for now, the investment in Stirling and allied submarine operations stands as a clear statement: the United States and its partners are preparing for scenarios once considered unlikely, placing strategic assets in positions meant to ensure readiness, resilience and a rapid response should the fragile peace of the Indo-Pacific ever falter.